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COLLEGE PRESIDENTS AND THE NCAA PRESIDENTS'
COMMISSION: ALL BARK AND NO BITE
LAURENCE M. ROSE*
I. INTRODUCTION
In December of 1989, Doug Weaver, athletics director at
Michigan State, announced that he would retire on July 1, 1990.
In accordance with established university policy to promote a
national search for qualified athletic administrators, Michigan
State President, John B. DiBiaggio, announced a search committee
composed of members of the school's athletic council and the vice-
president for finance. After advertising nationally and screening
the candidates, the committee would interview the finalists and
submit a recommendation to President DiBiaggio. If the' candi-
date met the president's approval, the recommendation would be
forwarded for formal approval to the school's Board of Trustees.
The search was not expected to be complete until Spring 1990.
A few days later, before the advertising began, George Perles,
the head football coach, openly indicated that he wanted to suc-
ceed Weaver. While it was not uncommon for a coach to become
an athletic director, Perles wanted to retain his position as head
coach. At that point only a handful of Division I-A universities had
dual appointment athletic directors. Fresh in everyone's mind
was the August 1989 resignation of Jim Valvano as athletics direc-
tor at North Carolina State amid reports of a lack of supervision in
the basketball program, where Valvano was also the head coach.
What made the Perles announcement even more dramatic
was the fact that Perles had permitted himself to be considered for
the head coaching position of the New York Jets of the NFL.
While publicly saying that he was "not interested in using the Jets
as a wedge,"' it was commonly known that the failure to obtain
the director's position would influence Perles' decision. Joel Fer-
guson, a trustee known to be a supporter and confidant of Perles,
announced that if Perles became athletic director, he would stay
at Michigan State.
This was not the first time that Perles, head coach since 1983,
had permitted himself to be considered for an NFL head coaching
* Professor of Law, University of Miami; B.A., 1969, State University of New York at
Stony Brook; J.D., 1972, New York University.
1. Lederman, Michigan State President Clashes With Some Trustees on Whether Coach
Should Direct All Sports Programs, Chron. Higher Ed., Jan. 24, 1990, at A36, col.3.
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position. In 1988, Perles received an offer from the Green Bay
Packers and was actively considering the position. The Michigan
State Board of Trustees, in the meantime, offered him a long term
contract and a large annuity, and Perles turned down the Packers.
Apparently these financial incentives were not enough to discour-
age Perles from considering the Jets' position just one year later.
Shortly after Perles' interest became known, President
DiBiaggio publicly suggested that both the concept and timing of
the issue of the dual position were inappropriate. As an adminis-
trator, President DiBiaggio felt that the athletic director could not
effectively act as a security check on the football coach if the two
positions were held simultaneously. Indicating that this concept is
not unique to athletics, DiBiaggio noted, "I'd feel it was equally
inappropriate for the dean of the medical school to be the vice-
president for health affairs. "2
Perhaps more important for a public university, DiBiaggio
was also opposed to any shortening of the search process, which
did not meet the university's affirmative action standards. Noting
that time was not critical, DiBiaggio explained that Weaver was in
the position until July 1, and Perles had not resigned as head
coach.
The Board of Trustees, however, were worried about the Jets'
recruiting of Perles and voted to shorten the search process in
time for a final vote at the Board's February 2, 1990 meeting-
about the same time that the Jets were expected to act. The
Board's chairman, Larry Owen, was concerned that if Perles
decided to leave without knowing the status of his candidacy, foot-
ball recruiting would be dramatically hurt. Indeed, despite the
fact that an athlete is committed by NCAA rules to the institution
to which he signs a National Letter of Intent, trustee Ferguson said
that it was Perles who the "parents and the kids are buying" not
Michigan State.3
Not surprisingly, faculty and student leaders at Michigan State
supported the recommendation of President DiBiaggio, placing
the issue of institutional control in the forefront of the debate.
Just ten days after the first advertisement of the position, the
Board of Trustees held an "emergency meeting," attended by
over 300 faculty, students, and others.4 Despite the vocal and pub-
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Michigan State Trustees Ignore President's Objections, Name Football Coach to
Direct Entire Sports Program, Chron. Higher Ed., Jan. 31, 1990, at A36, col.2.
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lie concerns, the trustees voted 5-3 to offer Perles the additional
duties as athletic director, effective July 1, 1990. The meeting pro-
cedure was heavily criticized and resulted from intense lobbying,
telephone calls, and private meetings that one East Lansing news-
paper claimed violated Michigan's open-meetings law. The lobby-
ing effort was so intense that the swing vote was cast by Kathy
Wilbur, a trustee who was a top aide to a state senator. Despite
previously indicating that a shortened timetable would undermine
the quality of the search process, Wilbur was silent at the meeting
prior to her voting in favor of the Perles' offer. After the meeting,
Wilbur said that people ought not to see this as a vote for "athletics
over academics" '5 but as a vote for "the stability of one program. "6
However, another trustee, Dean Pridgeon, felt that this "made the
athletic director accountable only to the board"'7 not President
DiBiaggio. "It puts the president in a position where he can't
operate long without absolute control over the athletic depart-
ment. If he decides to leave, we will not get a credible, responsi-
ble president to come in under those circumstances."'"
Describing President DiBiaggio as a national leader in the
reform effort, Robert Atwell, president of the American Council
on Education, said, "This is a major setback for the whole thrust
toward presidential control of collegiate sports."9
President DiBiaggio's leadership was severely compromised,
according to many faculty and students. Even DiBiaggio could not
suffer this blow in silence. "I've tried to view this as issue-oriented
and not personal, but if it begins to look like it's not that way, I
might have to reassess my position at Michigan State."' 1
This was not the only instance in recent times that a college
president's activities in the athletics area have been the subject of
trustees' concerns. At Oklahoma State University, a school then
under NCAA sanctions for recruiting and other violations, Presi-
dent John Campbell personally reinstated seven football players
who had flunked out. In February of 1990, the faculty passed a
"no confidence" vote, and student groups urged his resignation.
After a March 1990 special board meeting, which consumed
almost nine hours, the Board of Regents ordered President Camp-
bell to not become directly involved in the dismissal or readmis-
5. Id. at A38, col. 5.
6. Id.
7. Id. at col.4.
8. Id.
9. Id. at A36, col.2.
10. Id. at A38, col.4.
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sion of students. In noting that Campbell had violated university
policy, the board determined that Campbell was "essentially well
intentioned.""1 Despite the lack of faculty and student confi-
dence, Campbell remains at Oklahoma State.
The fact is that college presidents are obligated by the NCAA
to be in control of an institution's athletics program. Under its
rules, the president has ultimate authority and responsibility over
athletics. This principle of institutional responsibility is codified in
the NCAA Manual and reflected in the acknowledgment that it is
the duty of the president to designate the person who has the
power to cast the school's ballot at NCAA meetings. In theory,
then, college presidents can pass NCAA legislation which accom-
plishes academic-athletic goals, not merely athletic policies.
Despite this voting power, many college presidents fail to attend
NCAA meetings. For the January 1990 NCAA Annual Meeting, of
the 802 active member institutions, 185 presidents were pre-regis-
tered as voting, alternative, or visiting delegates for their institu-
tion. Only 169 attended. This number was up from the 1989
meeting, when 153 presidents pre-registered and 137 actually
attended. In 1991, a record 223 presidents attended, still not
more than thirty per-cent of the membership.
A. Kenneth Pye, president of Southern Methodist University,
a school that suffered the "death penalty" in football for repeated
violations of NCAA rules, has noted that "In too many cases, presi-
dents have not only delegated responsibility, they have abdicated
it."'1 2 This delegation of responsibility, which could include voting
authority at the NCAA meetings, has been described by Pye as
"sometimes... like entrusting a chicken coop to the supervision of
a wolf and a fox."'"
The fact that these statements were made in early 1990 sug-
gests something about the presidential reform movement and the
effectiveness of the Presidents' Commission. The fact that these
remarks were printed in the NCAA NEWS on February 15, 1990
indicates the widespread NCAA institutional response to the
actions of presidents and the commission. The basic concept is
that the presidents really are not in control, and there is only the
illusion of control-an illusion that is perpetuated by the establish-
11. Nicklin, Oklahoma State Board Ignores Call for Ouster of Controversial President,
Chron. Higher Ed., Mar. 7, 1990, at A37, col.2.
12. No Reform Measure Can Usurp CEO Responsibility, NCAA NEws, Feb. 4,1990, at
4, col.2.
13. Id. at col.2.
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ment of the Presidents' Commission and the continued
controversy.
II. HISTORY OF THE PRESIDENTS' COMMISSION
In the early 1980's, faced with what many felt was a crisis in
integrity in college sports, a group of college presidents began to
discuss ways for the heads of colleges to conform college athletics
to the academic model. As the American Council on Education
was discussing a Board of Presidents which could veto actions
taken by the NCAA membership, the NCAA Council, composed of
athletic officials and some presidents, developed a proposal to
establish a Presidents' Commission. Some felt the NCAA proposal
was designed to defuse the efforts to gain control by the presi-
dents. At the January 1984 convention, the debate lasted for more
than two hours. Since a constitutional amendment was involved, a
two-thirds majority vote was necessary. In what some believe was
a parliamentary maneuver, the vote on the ACE proposal came
first and was defeated 313 to 328. Shortly thereafter, a vote was
taken on the Council's proposal, and it was passed by voice vote
with no counting of ballots. The NCAA Council's proposal stated
that the purpose of the Presidents' Commission was to provide a
forum for presidents and to provide representation for the views
held by presidents and chancellors on major policy issues in col-
lege athletics. While the commission was permitted to study issues
(via the NCAA's customary budget procedure), urge action, spon-
sor legislation, and call special meetings, it also was empowered to
veto the hiring of the NCAA Executive Director. Nonetheless,
some presidents felt that the co-opting of the chief executive
officers had begun.
As a result of a survey undertaken by the Commission, a spe-
cial convention was held in June, 1985, to review eight legislative
proposals relating to "academic integrity," including a self-study
program, an academic-reporting requirement, distinctions
between "major" and "secondary" violations (including the "death
penalty" for repeat violators), and a required annual financial audit
of the athletic department. 4 Each of these proposals was well-
founded and based upon the survey, and was overwhelmingly
passed by more than 199 presidents and numerous other desig-
nated vice-presidents of the 791 member schools. The activity of
the Special Convention was designed to enhance the role of the
14. NCAA, 1989-90 NCAA PRESIDENTS COMMISSION HANDBOOK 4.
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presidents. Dr. Marshall Criser, president of the University of
Florida, felt that "[t]he ultimate responsibility must be assumed by
the CEOs because we don't have enough NCAA cops to solve all of
the problems."' 5
Even Walter Byers, then the NCAA Executive Director and
one who rarely spoke publicly, was quoted as saying that presiden-
tial involvement was "a necessity because some university presi-
dents have already lost control of their own schools' programs."' 6
He went on to say that he felt that presidential involvement was
not "merely a faddish interest among college presidents that will
disappear in time.' 7 Unfortunately, Byers may have been wrong
in his prediction.
At the regular NCAA meeting in January, 1986, proposals
regarding initial college eligibility, testing for street drugs, and
limitations on basketball competition were passed. But issues
regarding satisfactory academic progress, booster clubs, and spe-
cial-admissions programs were ignored. Presidents were not pub-
licly in attendance and the general consensus was that athletic
directors were in control of the meeting. This view was reinforced
by the release of a survey of 138 Division I presidents, which sup-
ported the view that the athletic directors actually controlled col-
legiate sports. Moreover, proposals to extend the hockey and
basketball seasons were approved, despite the fact that the 1985
Convention had passed by 429-3 a moratorium on the extension of
any sport's season. "If the moratorium is vacated, it's being
vacated not by the commission, but by this convention,"1 8 stated
Indiana University president John Ryan, who was stepping down
as the initial chair of the Presidents' Commission. One delegate
stated after the vote, "A lot of ADs figure they've successfully
waited out the presidents.... Unless the presidents fight back,
NCAA reform is flat-ass dead in the water."' 9
At the Annual Meeting in January, 1987, the presidents were
again relatively silent. The Presidents' Commission had proposed
only one piece of legislation, which created the same minimum
academic standard for initial eligibility in Division II as in Division
I. The proposal was narrowly passed.
15. Nightingale, New Orleans: Taking A First Step Toward Reorganizing NCAA,
Sporting News, June 3, 1985, at 14, col.2.
16. Nightingale, Calling for Change in the NCAA, Sporting News, June 24, 1985, at 12-
13.
17. Id.
18. Scorecard, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Jan. 12, 1985, at 14, col.1.
19. Id.
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Some presidents felt that the tide was turning against them.
• The Presidents' Commission then voted to flex its muscle and hold
another special convention in June, 1987, to consider various
"cost-containment" proposals and to begin a national forum to
address and attempt to identify the proper role of intercollegiate
athletics in American higher education.20 One hundred and forty-
seven Presidents attended of the 792 NCAA member institutions.
In the words of the NCAA's 1989-90 Presidents' Commission
Handbook, "several of the Commission's recommendations
regarding spring football practice and reductions in grants-in-aid
in the various sports were not successful."'' 2 In fact, not only were
the commission proposals defeated, but the convention approved
a proposal to restore two basketball scholarships that had been
removed at the January meeting. In addition, the Commission had
wanted to complete studies regarding costs in order to have them
considered at the 1988 annual meeting, but opponents lengthened
the time to eighteen months. Thus, no "cost-containment" was
accomplished at a meeting that cost the NCAA between $500,000
and $1.5 million.
What really became apparent at the 1987 special meeting was
the open conflict between college presidents, which reflected
their misperception of the balance in college athletics and their
clear lack of preparation for the meeting.
Jim Delaney, then commissioner of the Ohio Valley Confer-
ence and now of the Big Ten, said "Dallas was a miscalculation.
The presidents failed to recognize a terrific difference of opinion
on these issues. Every one of the cost-containment proposals has
broad philosophical underpinnings, and they didn't fully appreci-
ate that. The debate should have come first."2
Ira Heyman, chancellor at University of California-Berkeley,
recognized that the Presidents' Commission failure was avoidable.
"Unless we can provide presidents with information they didn't
presently have, in a way that is not arguable, they won't change
their minds."2 3
President John Slaughter, chair of the Presidents' Commis-
sion, was also quoted as admitting, "what some delegates were say-
ing all along-that the Presidents' Commission had not done a
20. NCAA PRESIDENTS COMMISSION HANDBOOK at 4 (1989-90).
21. Id.
22. Lederman, Rift Among Presidents Perils Drive to Reform Big-Time College Sports,
Chron. Higher Ed., Sept. 2, 1987, at A92, col.3.
23. Id. at A93, col.1.
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very good job in lobbying for its initiatives, even among university
presidents."2 4
The debate at the meeting also reflected a conflict between
presidents, coaches, and athletic directors. Proposal 19 involved
the reduction of Division I-A football scholarships from 95 to 90.
The Presidents' Commission proposal was presented by University
of Washington President William Gerberding in a manner so as to
not "exaggerate" its importance.2 It was opposed by Georgia
Tech athletic director Homer C. Rice, the Division I-A Director of
Athletics Association and the American Football Coaches Associa-
tion, as well as University of Nebraska head football coach Tom
Osborn and Penn States' Joe Paterno. Indeed, Paterno called the
proposal, at best, a "band-aid" approach.26 The proposal was then
defeated 39-69.
Despite the momentum against it, the Presidents' Commis-
sion, through California State University President Harold H.
Haak, placed before the convention a proposal to reduce the
number of football coaches, relying on a survey of Division I-A
presidents. The proposal was openly opposed by LaVell Edwards,
Brigham Young University's head coach, and the American Foot-
ball Coaches Association. Observing that the proposal was in
trouble, University of Minnesota President Kenneth Keller moved
to table the proposal until a study was completed for the 1988 con-
vention. The proposal was tabled by voice vote.
Observing that the momentum had now actually shifted, the
proposal to reverse the January vote and return the two basketball
scholarships was brought up. It ultimately passed. The split
among presidents was no more obvious than in the actions of Pres-
idents' Commission Chairman Slaughter, who voted to increase
the scholarships, stating that the Presidents' Commission's original
reduction proposal "was a mistake."2 7
While some have criticized the defeat of the Presidents' Com-
mission proposals as the result of insufficient information, Robert
H. Atwell, President of the American Council on Education,
believes it was due to poor planning and lack of willpower, which
may have resulted from great pressure placed upon them by
"vested interest. -2 8
24. Goodwin, NCAA Session Rebuffs Presidents, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1987, at B9, col.1.
25. NCAA Sixth Special Convention Proceeding at 86 (1987).
26. Actual quote from debate at the NCAA's Sixth Special Convention (1987).
27. Goodwin, Presidents Fumble Athletic Reform Bid, N.Y. Times, July 2, 1987, at B7,
col. 1.
28. Lederman, supra note 22, at A94, col.l.
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"There are presidents whose institutions are so deeply
involved in athletics that their own institutional and personal
futures hang in the balance. They feel they must resist such
change because athletics are bigger than they are," said Ernest L.
Boyer, President of the Carnegie Foundation for the Advance-
ment of Teaching.29
At the next annual meeting, in January of 1988, the Presi-
dents' Commission did not sponsor any legislation, and accord-
ingly, no vote of confidence was taken. However, at the 1989
Annual Meeting, the Presidents' Commission proposed financial
aid restrictions for certain Division I and II sports. One hundred
and thirty-seven presidents attended out of the 800 member insti-
tutions. After considerable debate, the measure was withdrawn in
favor of the establishment of a Special Committee on Cost Reduc-
tion. Again, the presidents' proposal was thwarted.
In October of 1989, the Presidents' Commission met to begin
its planning for the 1990 annual meeting. It developed proposals
shortening the basketball season and spring football practice,
granting need-based financial aid to academically deficient ath-
letes, and requiring the reporting of graduation rates. Martin Mas-
sengale, Chancellor of the University of Nebraska and Chair of the
Presidents' Commission, believed that the graduation rate data
proposal was necessary in order to preclude "further need for fed-
eral legislation" as proposed by Senator Bill Bradley and Represen-
tative Tom McMillen.30
The Commission proposals reflected the continuing desire for
the presidents to take control. "Since our formation, there has
been a persistent effort among the presidents to sort out what the
major issues are,"'" said Lattie Coor, then president of the Univer-
sity of Vermont and now of Arizona State. "We've taken these on,
one after another. [Our] meeting is another important step in an
ongoing process that illustrates that the presidents will continue to
assert themselves." 32
But the presidents' proposals drew quick opposition. "They
tend to want quick answers and you don't solve the complexities of
intercollegiate athletics,"3 3 said Jim Delaney, Commissioner of the
Big Ten. "Yes, presidents are involved, but the truth is, they really
29. Id. at col.2.
30. The Presidents Respond, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 16, 1989, at 26, col.2.
31. Rhoden, Groups to Consider Proposals to NCAA, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1989, at B13,
col. 1.
32. Id. at col.3.
33. Id.
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don't have time to be involved." 4
Bo Schembechler, University of Michigan athletic director
and head football coach, put it more explicitly. "Unfortunately,
you're dealing with people who don't understand. We're trying to
straddle the fence here because you still want me to put 100,000 in
the stadium and the reason you want me to do it is because you're
not going to help me financially at all." z5 Schembechler later
resigned his positions to become Detroit Tigers president. In
some parting shots, he said, "In the next five years, school presi-
dents will completely confuse intercollegiate athletics directors
then they'll dump it back to athletics directors and say, 'You
straighten this out.' About 2000, it may be back on track."'
This public debate previewed the 1990 Annual Meeting.
James J. Whalen, President of Ithaca College and former member
of the commission, stated that if the graduation rate and season
limiting proposals were to fail, "we can't be a credible group." 37
As a result, the commission began an attempt to get many college
presidents to attend the 1990 Annual Meeting. The recruitment
efforts were successful. Of the 802 member schools, 169 presi-
dents were in attendance and other president-picked delegates
were ready to vote.
The legislation regarding the reporting of graduation rates
easily passed. With the possibility of federal legislation and inter-
vention, the measure was approved in Division I by a vote of 320
to 4. William Tucker, Chancellor of Texas Christian University, in
support of the measure, recognized that "if it is done for us, shall
we say, it will be done to us. '"38
Similarly, the convention passed the proposal to permit col-
leges to provide need-based non-athletic aid to athletes who fail to
meet initial eligibility requirements, by a vote of 258-66. The
debate, however, previewed the upcoming schism, as there were
three different positions taken by the debaters. Edward Fort,
Chancellor of North Carolina A&T, was pleased, noting "Life is a
bowl of compromises. ' 'z3
Then the debate began on the proposal to shorten the basket-
ball season and reduce spring football practice opportunities. At
34. Id.
35. Rhoden, College Presidents Prepare to Police Sports, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1989, § 4,
at 24, col.4.
36. U.S.A. Today, Jan. 22, 1990.
37. NCAA NEws, Dec. 27, 1989, at 4, col.3.
38. Rules changes adopted, Chron. Higher Ed., Jan. 17, 1990, at Al, A37, co.1.
39. Id.
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the outset, the battle lines were drawn. A motion was made to
defer for study the entire proposal. After intense debate, the
deferral motion was defeated, but only by a 20 vote margin, 383-
363. The presidents breathed a sigh of relief. Some even felt that
victory was in hand. The Presidents' Commission Chair,
Nebraska's Martin Massengale, even left the meeting to fly to Chi-
cago. But others began twisting arms and votes during the lunch
break. Athletic directors were concerned about the impact on
finances. Tennessee's Doug Dickey complained, "We're talking
about significant dollars here."40
Acting with parliamentary maneuvering, the opponents of
season-shortening submitted a proposal to delay action on the
.Presidents' Commission proposal and refer it to the NCAA Coun-
cil. With many presidents out of the room, the motion to refer
passed 170 to 150 on a roll call vote. During the debate, the Presi-
dents' Commission was strongly criticized. Donna Lopiano,
women's AD at University of Texas, said, "The Presidents' Com-
mission needs to do what it does best, and that is to macro-manage.
Leave the micro-management to the various expert groups. We
will bring back solutions. '41
Many presidents were angry and upset. Thomas Hearn of
Wake Forest threatened to resign from the commission, noting
that "any of us who have spent two years working to get these
proposals have to be disappointed. '42 Moreover, Hearn said that
the failure to act decisively on the proposal was "morally
unacceptable."4 3
Then the remaining presidents began to act. Hearn, Univer-
sity of New Orleans President Gregory O'Brien, and Arizona
State's Lattie Coor began to arm-twist representatives who they
believed voted against the desires of the respective presidents.
After over an hour, when it seemed that some votes could be
changed, such as five members of the Eastern College Athletic
Conference (Coor was formerly at the University of Vermont) and
four members of the American South Conference (where New
Orleans belongs), a motion to reconsider the referral vote was
made by Coor. The debate was fast and furious.
Lieutenant General Dave R. Palmer of West Point urged the
40. Id. at A36, col.2.
41. Rhoden, Harmony and Dissonance as NCAA Meets, N.Y. Times, Jan. 12, 1990, at
A28, col.2.
42. Chron. Higher Ed., supra note 38, at A36, col.3.
43. Id.
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reconsideration miotion, noting that the NCAA needed "to make a
mark on the wall.... Delay is the deadliest form of denial."'4 4
Finally, after some more minor votes and some compromises,
the motion to reconsider was passed, and the final vote to adopt
succeeded, 165-156. The vote was seen as a vote of confidence of
the Presidents' Commission. "To be blunt, the presidents needed
a win in Dallas. Our credibility within the NCAA was at stake. We
were better organized than ever before and we had to be. The
margin of passage for the reforms was earned only after the most
intensive lobbying efforts I have ever seen,"' 45 wrote Mansfield
University of Pennsylvania President and Commission member
Rodney C. Kelchner, in the NCAA News. "We've been on the
sidelines too long. "46
But the battle lines were now drawn for the future. Presi-
dents began a campaign to assert institutional control over athlet-
ics, while athletic directors urged presidents to stay out of what
the ADs feel is the day-to-day operation of departments. "Presi-
dents drive me up the wall," said Texas' Lopiano.4r "They come
in two days, three or four times a year, and they think they under-
stand what's happening to this world called athletics. They do not.
The presidents act as if they can come in, fix this, and leave."48
The Task Force on Intercollegiate Athletics, a special commit-
tee of the Irvine Group composed of retired presidents, recently
concluded that the current presidents have been "less attentive
than they might have been,"4 9 while the NCAA "decision-making
structure is dominated by athletic directors and faculty represent-
atives, all honorable people, but unlikely to be advocates for
change."5 The Task Force continued, "The N.C.A.A. governance
system makes it difficult for presidents to develop a consensus on
what needs to be done. The decision-making process then makes
it exceedingly difficult to accomplish the objectives of any consen-
sus, so difficult that effective reform is unlikely to be sustained
without fundamental alternation in that process. "51
After the 1990 meeting, the goal of cost-cutting was adopted
44. Id. at col.5.
45. Kelchner, College Presidents Finally Get Off the Sidelines, NCAA NEws, Feb. 14,
1990, at 5, col.2.
46. Id. at col.5.
47. Rhoden, Who's In Charge of Athletics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 1990, § 5, at 4, col.4.
48. Id.
49. The Crisis in Intercollegiate Athletics, a Report by a Panel of Retired College
Presidents, Chron. Higher Ed., Mar. 7, 1990, at A38, col.1.
50. Id. at col.2.
51. Id.
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by athletic directors and conferences. Some insiders believe that
such an approach is again likely to co-opt the strength of the presi-
dents asserted at the 1990 convention. Indeed, when the commis-
sioners proposed a package of reforms in April, 1990, Thomas
Hearn, President of Wake Forest, stated that he felt the proposals
were the "single most promising thing that's happened since I've
been on the presidents' commission."'5 2 But the Big Ten's commis-
sioner, Jim Delaney, put it differently: "We've put together a
package-the question now is whether others will be able to break
it down and pick it apart."5 3
Inroads were suggested on the success of the Presidents' Com-
mission at the 1990 meeting. "The 1991 convention is going to be
a doozy," said Syracuse's AD Jake Crouthamel.54 Recently a group
of coaches appeared before the Knight Commission on Intercolle-
giate Athletics, asking that college presidents consult with them
during the decision-making process. But again the willingness to
work together is tempered with special-interest. During the pres-
entation, the coaches recommended that the length of the basket-
ball season be restored back to the pre-1990 convention level,
although legislation introduced at the 1991 convention to reverse
the presidents' success was defeated by the membership.
At the 1991 convention, over 110 proposals were up for vote.
The Presidents appeared in record number (223) and reaped the
benefits of massive lobbying efforts. Some insiders said,. on the
other hand, that the presidents' efforts had become institutional-
ized and reactive, rather than prospective and planned. Many
cost-cutting proposals were backed by a special non-presidential
NCAA cost-reduction committee. Confronted by massive budget
crunches at their universities, college officials welcomed methods
to reduce athletic spending. Suggesting that money saved by
reducing athletic spending could be used for scholarships for dis-
advantaged students, Thomas K. Hearn, Jr., President of Wake
Forest University stated, "Why is it that the students we are always
so concerned about are those that are 6-foot-9 and have soft jump
shots. Let's do something about educational opportunity for all
students."5 5 Yet athletic directors and coaches bemoaned the loss
of scholarships to players and revenue from basketball games.
52. Lederman, Early Reports Show Widespread Backing for New Reform Plan, Chron.
Higher Ed., Apr. 18, 1990, at A37, col.2.
53. Id. at col.3.
54. Reformers Eye 1991 Convention; Drug Tests Toughened, New Help for Athletes
Passed and Proposed; the Big 12?, CHRON. HIGHER ED., Jan. 17, 1990, at A36, col.1.
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Donna Lopiano, director of women's athletics at the University of
Texas at Austin, said, "To further diminish opportunities for
female athletes when they aren't close to the men in the first place
is unwise and unfair."'
Although the action taken in the 1991 convention shows that
the muscle of the Presidents' Commission is possible, many believe
that most of the work regarding true reform of intercollegiate ath-
letics, academic standards, remains to be done. Indeed, if the past
is a prediction of the debate, the broad presidential consensus
reached at the 1991 convention may fall apart before the 1992
meeting. When last debated, academic differences between
schools kept an agreement from being reached on nationwide
minimum grade point averages.
In summing up the 1991 convention, Chancellor William E.
Davis of Louisiana State University said, "I don't think the presi-
dents are really interested in what's best for students or for the
institutions. They're just interested in showing who's boss."'5 7 But
no president will allow the group to be the boss of his institution
and dictate what is satisfactory academic/athletic progress of his
school.
Do the presidents have control over athletics? Miami AD Sam
Jankovich says, "We have our differences, but I honestly believe
that presidents have the control and power they need."'  Others
disagree. The Task Force on Intercollegiate Athletics recom-
mended that true control cannot occur within the current NCAA
structure. Specifically, it suggests:
1. Strengthening the role of the presidents and chan-
cellors within the N.C.A.A., providing them with greater
authority, and considering a reduction in the size of the
Presidents' Commission (currently 44 members).
2. Considering delegating to the Commission the
responsibility for setting academic standards.
3. Supporting the Presidents' Commission with a full-
time, independent staff to be hired by the Commission
and to report to the Commission.59
In the enforcement arena, presidents are now being prodded
by the introduction by some state legislatures of proposals to pro-
56. Id. at A38, col.4.
57. Id. at A39, col.5.
58. Batard, ADs Back Stipends, Re-Entry, Miami Herald, June 13, 1990, at 6C, col.2.
59. Chron. Higher Ed., supra note 49, at A38, col.5.
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vide due process to NCAA schools during the infractions process.
Just like the NCAA presidents responded to the possible govern-
mental requirement of graduation rate information, so can they
provide reform to the process of investigating, processing, and
resolving infractions. But will they?
Wilford Bailey, former NCAA and Auburn president, noted
that criticism of the close relationship between the enforcement
staff and the infractions committee was "to a degree justified."'
He recommended to Steve Morgan, assistant executive director
for enforcement, that presidents who were involved in the infrac-
tions process be asked to critique the process. He specifically men-
tioned Florida president, Marshall Criser. Criser was never
contacted, nor did Bailey recommend legislation to accomplish the
result.
President Dennis Murray of Marist was very critical of the
process of investigating and processing infractions. "The NCAA
Manual says this is supposed to be a cooperative venture between
the college and the infractions staff to seek the truth. But the only
truth they wanted to seek was what we did. They never wanted to
deal with their errors."6 1 No proposed legislation to change the
process was suggested by Marist officials.
"At the first hearing, we were not really being heard by the
infractions committee, but by the enforcement staff," says Cleve-
land president, Walter Waetjen. 2 "If you look at where the locus
of power was, it was in that staff. I felt that increasingly as the
hearing went on."'63 Cleveland State made no proposals for
change, nor did Waetjen, an original member of the Presidents'
Commission.
At the 1991 convention, Executive Director Dick Schultz
mainstreamed the infractions/enforcement controversy by sug-
gesting that if the NCAA doesn't reform the process, the outside
arena will. He suggested a special subcommittee of the NCAA
Council be formed to study the process. Yet, D. Alan Williams,
Chair of the Committee on Infractions, noted, "I would be quite
surprised if it resulted in radical change."64
The bottom line is that the presidents and the Presidents'
Commission have the power to effect rules changes in the enforce-
60. Yaeger, Undue Procen: The NCAA's Injustice for All at 153 (1991).
61. Id. at 35.
62. Id. at 151.
63. Id.
64. Chron. Higher Ed., Jan. 16, 1991, A39, col.2.
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ment/infractions process. Can they exercise that power? If it is
exercised, will it be reversed by the following year's convention?
The fact that these questions cannot be answered show that the
NCAA's tail is wagging the university dog.
